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Comments
MARITIME INSURGENCY AND THE LAW OF THE
SEA: AN ANALYSIS USING THE
DOCTRINE OF DISTRESS
This Comment examines the international legal implications of
an insurgent warship operating on the high seas. The specific is-
sues addressed are the right of insurgents to conduct maritime
operations and the right of third States to deny use of the high
seas to insurgents. The issues are brought into aforum by means
of the doctrine of distress, or force majeure. The Comment consid-
ers the insurgent warship in turn as a pirate vessel, and as state-
less, and concludes that an insurgent is neither. Thus an
insurgent warship is not generally subject to lawful interference
on the high seas by third States.
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most effective way to introduce the topic of this
Comment is to propose the following scenario: Ria Ensete is a
dictatorship on a Latin American island. The government has
normal diplomatic relations with most nations, including the
United States, and is a member of both the United Nations and
the Organization of American States. An insurgent movement,
the Provisional Republic, forcibly contests the dictatorship. The
Provisional Republic is formally recognized by over a dozen na-
tions as "the legitimate government of Ria Ensete," and has a
"government-in-exile" in one of them. While the insurgents enjoy
significant popular support in Ria Ensete, the government forces
have maintained effective control over virtually all of the island,
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thus limiting the Republican forces to raids conducted from
outside the country.
Two years ago, pursuant to a policy of strengthening anti-com-
munist navies, the United States transferred a surplus warship to
Ria Ensete. After the transfer was complete, a part of the crew
spirited the ship out of Ria Ensete and declared it the flagship of
the navy of the Provisional Republic. Subsequently, operating
out of a third country port, the ship has been highly effective in
controlling the territorial waters ofRia Ensete. It has destroyed
government patrol craft, transported and supplied raiding parties,
bombarded coastal installations, and enforced a partial blockade
of arms shipments to Ria Ensete. The insurgents have also used
the ship for diplomatic visits to recognizing countries.
Recently, caught in a tropical storm, the ship collided with a
United States merchant vessel in international waters. Seriously
damaged, the ship escaped sinking only by taking refuge in a Pu-
erto Rican port.
The following day, the owners of the merchant vessel filed a
maritime libel in a United States District Court' against the ship
and requested a warrant for arrest of the ship. This warrant was
issued and served on the commanding officer, who accepted it but
refused to permit any possessory actions.
Within three days, the following had been filed:
(1) An answer, by the insurgents, claiming immunity from lo-
cal jurisdiction based on entry into port due to circumstances of
distress, or force majeure.
(2) An intervention, by the Ria Ensete government, alleging
the ship to be a pirate under article 15 of the 1958 Convention
on the High Seas,2 and requesting reconveyance.
Subsequently, the original complaint was settled out of court.
The district court is thus left with the Ria Ensete claim for recon-
veyance and the claim by the warship to immunity from local
jurisdiction.
Using the preceding scenario, this Comment will explore the
potential legal issues raised by operation of a warship on the high
seas by a political entity other than a sovereign "State."3 The par-
1. The district courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over civil cases of
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976).
2. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 15, 13 U.S.T. 2312, TJ.AS.
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter cited as High Seas Convention].
3. The generally accepted meaning of the term "State" combines territorial
and political sovereignty. The Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26,
1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, established that criteria for state-
hood include: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government;
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ticular focus is on a relatively new type of "international" insur-
gency which is being encountered with increasing frequency: It
operates from sanctuaries in a third State rather than from con-,
trolled national territory.4 While such an insurgency does not
meet generally accepted standards of legitimacy,5 some examples
exist where supportive third States have sought to legitimatize
these movements through recognition.6 The availability of effec-
tive maritime power to an insurgency in the form of missile-capa-
ble gunboats 7 and the sweeping changes in maritime jurisdiction
evolving from the Law of the Sea Conferences increase the
probability of a "maritime insurgency." This was demonstrated
by an August 1981 incident involving an Iranian gunboat.9 The
160-foot missile-capable Tabarzin had been built in France under
a contract with the former government of the Shah. The Shah
was deposed prior to completion, and representatives of the new
regime took delivery of the warship. Enroute from France to Iran,
anti-Khomeini commandos, members of the insurgent group
Azedegan, boarded and seized the ship. Their intentions were to
seek refuge in Morocco, but mechanical and supply problems
forced them to the French Riviera, where the incident ended.' 0 A
more successful seizure could have led to a protracted maritime
and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states. Id. art. 1. See infra
notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
4. Examples of "international insurgency" include Palestine, Namibia, Sara-
Wak, Spanish Sahara, Vietnam and Rhodesia. See generally O'Neill, Insurgency: A
Framework for Analysis, in INSURGENCY IN THE MODERN WORLD 1, 15-16 (B.
O'Neill, W. Heaton, & D. Alberts eds. 1980).
5. Control of a definite area of national territory is a general prerequisite.
See Higgins, Internal War and International Law, in 3 THE FUTURE OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 81, 86-87 (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1971).
6. A ready example of a recognized insurgency is Palestine; the Palestine
Liberation Organization has been recognized by numerous governments, the Or-
ganization of Arab States, and to an extent, the United Nations, including status as
a signatory observer at the Law of the Sea Conference, even though the only terri-
tory it "controlled" was in a third State. See Conuent, Standing Before the Inter-
national Court of Justice; The Question of Palestinian Statehood Exemplifies the
Inconsistencies of the Requirement of Statehood, 7 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 454, 454-56
(1977).
7. See generally Hazlett, Strait Shooting, U.S. NAVAL INST. PRoc., June 1982,
at 70 (discussing acquisition of missile-carrying warships by nations bordering in-
ternational straits).
8. See generally J. NYE, SHOULD WE CUT OR LOSES? U.S. FOREIGN PoUcy &
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1-5 (1981) (discussing the historical background and juris-
dictional evolution in the ocean regime).
9. N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1981, at Al, coL 1.
10. N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1981, at A3, col. 4.
resistance to the Khomeini government. Legal issues might well
have arisen involving third States, particularly if the rebels at-
tempted to establish a blockadell of oil exports from Iran.
Other instances of potential maritime insurgency exist,12 and
changes in the ocean regime brought about by the Law of the Sea
Conferences will heighten the potential. In particular is the in-
crease in non-high seas area for potential conduct of maritime
civil strife. With coastal State jurisdiction increasing from a nar-
row three-mile belt to possibly thirty percent of the world ocean,13
there is an expansive arena created for domestic hostilities.1 4
One commentator notes: "With the emergence of new types of
maritime zones the area of the high seas will shrink considerably,
providing a quite expanded, relatively safe area for the acts of in-
surgents. It would appear that if such zones come into existence,
rebels will be fairly accommodated."15
In order to properly examine the legal issues involved, a forum
is necessary. Courts of law do not convene on the high seas1 6
since such a manifestation is an exercise of sovereignty, which is
forbidden by international law.17 Courts of law do, however, con-
vene on the high seas in a figurative sense when a municipal or
international court, in the course of deciding a case arising from
an incident on the high seas, resolves the various issues from the
perspective of the legal framework of the high seas "regime"
within which the incident occurred. The premise of this Com-
ment is that a high seas issue of law can be beneficially analyzed
11. See generally C. CoLoamxos, TaE IrmNRNATONAL LAw OF TmE SEA 454 (1962)
(discussing blockades by insurgents).
12. A minor example of potential insurgency involves the anti-Castro Cuban
exiles, known by various names, including Alpha 66 and Cubans United. San Di-
ego Union, Aug. 16, 1981, at Ag, coL1. A major example is the now-unrecognized
Republic of China on Taiwan, with a sizable navy.
13. Booth, Military Implications of the Changing Law of the Sea, in LAw OF
THE SEA: NEGLECTED IssuEs 341 (J. Gamble, Jr., ed. 1979).
14. The thrust of this Comment addresses a unique concern of maritime sta-
bility. While the provisions of article 58 of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982) [hereinafter referred to as Con-
vention], permit "high seas" operations within the Exclusive Economic Zone, such
operations must not interfere with coastal State regulation of resource exploita-
tion. The existence of civil strife in the maritime zone may lead to creation of
Maritime Control Zones by the belligerents involved, in order to effectuate actual
control over the resource exploitation. See generally S. SwARZ=TA UER, TuE
THREE-MILE LInT OF TERRITORIAL SEAS 152-56 (1972) (discussing Maritime Control
Zones during World War I1).
15. Crockett, Toward a Revision of the International Law of Piracy, 26 DE
PAUL L. REV. 78, 96 (1976).
16. A proceeding such as a court-martial on a naval vessel is not "on the high
seas," but is within a moving part of the territorial jurisdiction of the sovereign.
See C. COLOmBos, supra note 11, at 259-60.
17. High Seas Convention, supra note 2, art. 2.
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by transporting a piece of the high seas into a courtroom. Accord-
ingly, the factual scenario at the beginning of this Comment
serves both to introduce the question into a United States court,
and to provide a framework within which the parameters of such
a problem may be considered. The method of introduction se-
lected was through the doctrine of distress, or force majeure.18
This doctrine, which in essence gives a ship forced into port by
storm or other exigency immunity from local jurisdiction, is con-
sidered to have universal and traditional acceptance among sea-
faring nations.19
The doctrine of distress will be initially analyzed to show a per-
ceived shifting in approach: from a concept of distress immunity
as an all-encompassing exception to local jurisdiction, to a more
limited concept of distress immunity as an exception to local ju-
risdiction based on "refuge" from the high seas. Under the latter
approach, local jurisdiction over vessels entering port due to dis-
tress is extended to those vessels which had no basic right to use
the high seas. The result of this approach is that a district court,
in ascertaining whether local jurisdiction exists over the vessel,
must determine whether the vessel could have been lawfully in-
terfered with on the high seas. Such determination is the object
of this Comment, and the discussion will be ultimately reduced to
analysis of two issues which the scenario would present to a dis-
18. The two terms distress and force majeure are normally used interchangea-
bly, and will be within this Comment. In a strict sense, however, distress refers to
a condition of plight caused by weather, damage to the ship, or lack of provisions.
Force majeure refers to the involuntary entry caused by an overwhelming force,
such as a mutiny. See Harvard Law School, Research in International Law: Terri-
torial Waters, 23 AM. J. I'L L 299 (Spec. Supp. 1929) [hereinafter cited as
Harvard: Territorial Waters].
19. See infra note 22 and accompanying text. The scenario is intended to be,
to whatever extent possible, "neutral," to promote an objective judicial considera-
tion as opposed to legal reasoning which merely supports a deference to a State
Department "suggestion." See Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department
Suggestions: Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper?, 48 COmRELL
LQ. 461 (1963). Procedural questions, including standing, are relevant only as do-
mestic concerns, without significance to the Law of the Sea, and, accordingly, are
not addressed in this Comment. A related issue, the doctrine of immunity of a for-
eign sovereign as applied to an insurgent warship, is beyond the scope of this
Comment. As a general proposition, however, that doctrine is based on comity,
rather than customary international law, and the insurgent warship would be un-
likely to receive the privilege. See generally Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611; Annot., 25 A.L.R.3D 322 (1969); Annot., 99 L. Ed. 403
(1954).
trict court: (1) consideration of an insurgent warship as a pirate
vessel; and (2) consideration of an insurgent warship as stateless.
INSURGENT VESSELS IN DISTRESS
Historical Development of International Customary Law
Pertaining to Distress
The right of vessels to enter the territorial waters of another
State is by no means traditional, and the status of foreign ships in
coastal waters was, for centuries, precarious.20 The development
and current status of overall entry rights is beyond the scope of
this Comment,2 1 but the right of entry by ships in distress has
been among the most accepted.
There is one condition under which a foreign vessel in territorial waters
may claim as of right an entire immunity from the local jurisdiction. The
condition is that such presence in territorial waters be due to force
majeure. If a ship is driven in by storm, carried in by mutineers, or seeks
refuge for vital repairs or provisioning, international customary law de-
clares that the local state shall not take advantage of its necessity.2 2
The principle has been recognized for over two centuries.23 In
1799, for example, the American sloop Nancy was forced by stress
of weather to make port in France, in violation of the Non-Inter-
course Act of 1798.24 Upon departure it was only permitted to
carry away local produce. In a subsequent action in which the
Nancy was charged with violating the Act, the vessel was found
not guilty. The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Chief
Justice Marshall, said:
Even if an actual and general war had existed between this country and
France, and the plaintiff had been driven into a French port, a part of his
cargo seized, and he had been permitted by the officers of the port to sell
the residue, and purchase a new cargo, I am of the opinion that it would
not have been deemed such a traffic with the enemy as would vitiate the
policy upon such new cargo.2 5
Recognizing the critical need for maritime nations to establish a
concept of refuge from the perils of the sea, and with an eye to
the potential danger to such custom if abused by fraud, Sir Wil-
liam Scott formulated the generally accepted legal requisites of
the doctrine of force majeure:
Real and irresistible distress must be at all times a sufficient passport for
20. See 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAw 197 (3d ed. 1957).
21. See Lowe, The Right of Entry into Maritime Ports in International Law, 14
SA DIEGo L. REV. 597 (1977).
22. P. JEsSUp, THE LAw OF TERuTOlAL WATERS AND MlAmnmE JUPuSDICTIoN
194 (1927).
23. See 2 OPPENHEIm'S INTERNATiONAL LAw 479 (Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952) (not-
ing a 1746 incident).
24. Ch. 53, 1 Stat. 565.
25. Hallet & Bowne v. Jenks (the sloop Nancy), 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 210, 219
(1805).
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human beings under any such application of human laws. Now, it must be
an urgent distress; it must be something of grave necessity; such as...
where a ship is said to be driven in by stress of weather. It is not suffi-
cient to say it was done to avoid a little bad weather, or in consequence of
foul winds; the danger must be such as to cause apprehension in the mind
of an honest and firm man.2 6
Courts have extended the doctrine to cargo carried on a ship.
During the War of 1812, an American privateer captured the Brit-
ish brig Concord, and after bringing in the prize, the cargo was
sold. The Supreme Court upheld a claim by the neutral owners of
the cargo for restoration of the proceeds, and without payment of
import duties. The opinion by Justice Story held that such intro-
duction byforce majeure could not be considered importation, in
the legal sense.2 7 In subsequent cases, the closest scrutiny was
paid to the factual circumstances attending the claim of necessity,
and the perceived intent of the overall voyage was judicially
considered.2 8
As the doctrine of distress became approved as a principle of
custom2 9 in international law, a number of nations included provi-
sions in treaties regarding vessels in distress.30 These treaties
often became the basis for arbitrations involving assessments lev-
ied against vessels, where entry was claimed a necessity.3' An
example involved the American schooner Rebecca.3 2 While
bound for Brazos, Texas, in 1884 with general merchandise and a
26. The Eleanor, Edw. 135, 159, 165 Eng. Rep. 842, 1058 (1809) (the opinion also
included "moral necessity" where, for instance, previous damage made continua-
tion of the voyage dangerous to the lives of persons on board).
27. The Brig Concord, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 387, 388 (1815).
28. See, e.g., The New York, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 59 (1818) (distress denied as
based on "trivial accidents" and accompanied by overall suspicious
circumstances).
29. "Custom is the most important source of the international law of the sea
and the usages of the great maritime States must therefore always exercise a
weighty influence on its development." C. COLOmBos, supra note 11, at 7. Interna-
tional law is created by two principal sources: legislation and custom. L KELSEN,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 440-41 (R. Tucker 2d ed. 1966). Legislation is
conscious and deliberate centralized lawmaking by special organs. Custom is un-
conscious and unintentional decentralized behavioral practice which, after re-
peated performance by individual States acting under a perceived obligation,
evolves into a norm. Id.
30. See 1 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 745 (1945); 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER,
supra note 20, at 197.
31. 2 J. MooRE, DIGEST OF INTERNAToNAL LAw § 208, at 339-62 (1908); 2 J.
MooRE, ImRNATIONAL ARBrrRATIONS 1055-69 (1898); 4 J. MooRE, INTERNATIONAL
ARBrrRATIONS 4346-79 (1898).
32. A detailed account is found in 2 J. MooRE, DIGEST, supra note 31, at 345-48;
see also W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAw 612-15 (3d ed. 1971).
cargo of lumber for Tampico, Mexico, the ship was seriously dam-
aged by a storm which drove it south to the vicinity of Tampico.
Unable to make Brazos, the Rebecca entered Tampico and noti-
fied authorities of the distress. However, Mexican customs offi-
cials charged the ship's Master with smuggling and, under court
order, seized and sold the ship and cargo. The subsequent claims
commission found for the vessel owner.33
Codification of the Doctrine of Distress: The Law of the Sea
Conferences
In 1928-29, in anticipation of the 1930 Hague Convention,
Harvard Law School conducted a project on Research in Interna-
tional Law, which included proposals for draft conventions on
relevant subjects. The proposed convention on territorial waters
included an article covering vessel entry under conditions of
distress:
Article 17
A state may exercise jurisdiction over a vessel of another state which is in
its territorial waters for purposes other than innocent passage through its
marginal sea to the same extent as over a vessel in port. However, a ves-
sel engaged on a bona fide voyage which is not approaching, entering or
leaving a port of the littoral state, and which enters territorial waters or
breaks innocent passage because of distress or force majeure, shall, to-
gether with the persons and property on board, be immune from all penal-
ties, dues or exactions which might otherwise have been incurred by
reason of its presence in territorial waters.34
The Harvard project is important insofar as it was the base of
reference for the first Law of the Sea Conference.35 From that
conference came the 1958 conventions, including the Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.3 6 Article 14 of
that Convention reads, in pertinent part:
1. Subject to the provisions of these articles, ships of all States... shall
enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. 2. Passage
means navigation through the territorial sea .... 3. Passage includes
stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to
ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or by
distress.37
This provision was included in the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion.3 8 In addition to the above international codifications, some
33. Case of Kate A. Hoff (United States v. Mexico), Opinions of Commission-
ers 174 (1929).
34 Harvard: Territorial Waters, supra note 18, art. 17.
35. Sundberg, Piracy: Air and Sea, 20 DE PAUL L. Rav. 337, 373 (1971).
36. Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.IA.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
37. Id., art. 14.
38. Article 18, paragraph 2, of the Convention, supra note 14, discussing inno-
cent passage reads:
Passage shall be continuous and expeditious. However, passage in-
cludes stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are inciden-
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municipal statutes and cases exist.39
Scope of the Doctrine of Distress
Thus far in history, there does not appear to be any recorded
incident involving an insurgent vessel claiming distress. To ascer-
tain the reception of such a claim, specifically in a United States
court, an investigation of the limits of the doctrine is appropriate.
This involves a determination as to whether there are classes of
vessels which, despite factual circumstances of distress, are not
entitled to immunity from local jurisdiction. The scope of the doc-
trine is considered under two approaches: (1) distress as an all-
encompassing exception; and (2) distress as a refuge from the
high seas.
The All-Encompassing Exception
This approach looks at a claim of distress with only the mari-
ner's eye. If distress is genuine, the ship is immune from local ju-
risdiction, and no consideration is given to the ownership,
nationality, or use of the ship. French statutory law says simply
that 'force majeure necessarily makes an exception to all rules."40
The United States pressed Great Britain over the absolute prin-
ciples of the distress doctrine in a series of five cases between
1831 and 1841 involving American ships carrying slaves.41 The five
ships involved were all carrying slaves in cabotage.42 Three were
wrecked in the Bahamas (Comet in 1831, Encomium in 1833, Her-
mosa in 1840); local British authorities liberated all the slaves.
The fourth ship, the Enterprize, was forced by stress of weather
and lack of provisions to put into Bermuda in 1835. A local court
issued a writ against the master to produce the slaves, who were
tal to ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or
distress or for the purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships or air-
craft in danger or distress.
Articles 39. and 54 incorporate the doctrine as regards transit passage through
straits and archipelagic sea lanes passage, respectively.
39. See, e.g., Harvarch Territorial Waters, supra note 18, at 300-07.
40. Id. at 301.
41. Detailed accounts of distress incidents are located in P. Jzssup, supra note
22, at 197-202, and 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST, supra note 31, at 350-61.
42. Cabotage is defined as coastal trade between ports of the same State. This
type of trade enjoys special protections, normally a national monopoly, recognized
in international law. See generally C. CoLomnos, supra note 11, at 383-86.
set free.43 The fifth ship involved, the Creole, was forced into Nas-
sau in 1841 by the slaves on board, who had revolted, killing one
person and wounding four others. After three days of histrionics
involving the American consul, other Americans in port, local
magistrates, local militia officials, and a mob of natives, the slaves
not implicated in the murder were set free."4
The British paid an indemnity for the Comet and Encomium in-
cidents, but refused to acknowledge any liability in the Enterprize,
Hermosa, and Creole cases on the ground that, since these oc-
curred after the 1834 effective date of the Act abolishing slavery in
the British Colonies,45 the slaves became free upon entering Brit-
ish jurisdiction.
The three cases were submitted for arbitration under an 1853
treaty establishing a mixed claims commission.46 Mr. Bates, the
umpire, awarded compensation to the United States claimants in
all three cases.47 Two principles were underscored in the deci-
sions accompanying the slave ship cases. The first is that the
"law of nations" are determinative in cases of distress, when in
conflict with municipal law, even though the latter is statutory
while the former is often an "understanding" of custom and inter-
national acceptance as expounded by infrequent writers.48 The
second is that a legal remedy is often an acceptable palliative
under international law for an equitable remedy made unattaina-
ble by municipal law, or by political exigencies. In support of the
latter proposition, the reality of the five cases is that the slaves
stayed free.49 With respect to the principles of the doctrine of dis-
tress, the extent of claim by the Americans, agreed to by the Brit-
ish, supports an extremely broad application of the doctrine.
43. See 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST, supra note 31, at 350.
44. A detailed narrative of the incident is in id. at 358-60.
45. Act of 28 Aug. 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, ch. 73.
46. Claims Convention, Feb. 8, 1853, United States-Great Britain, 10 Stat. 988,
T.S. No. 123.
47. 4 J. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBrrRATIONS, supra note 31, at 4372-79. The
comments of Bates, the arbitrator, reflected on both the laws of nations and the
slavery circumstances. Id.
48. Of interest is the fact that the opinions by Bates liberally cited "the law of
nations," but nowhere referenced where an exposition of the limits of those laws
was to be found. See id. at 4349-78.
49. While the obvious retort to this observation is the length of time from inci-
dent to settlement, a rereading of the Enterprize and Creole narrations found in 2
J. MooRE, DIGEST, supra note 31, at 356, 360, supports the proposition that, had
Webster and Ashburton been arguing before Bates on the wharf in Hamilton or
the beach in Nassau, a legal remedy would have been quite acceptable. As this
relates to the main subject of this Comment it is important to understand that
modern insurgents invoke deep emotional responses within the populace, which
international law must accommodate if it is to be accepted by the municipal au-
thorities who ultimately must enforce it. See generally Reisman, The Enforcement
of International Judgments, 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (1969).
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A furor arose over these incidents in both Congress and Parlia-
ment. The exchanges between Secretary of State Webster and
Lord Ashburton, involved the essence of jurisdiction over vessels.
Webster argued:
A vessel on the high seas... is regarded as part of the territory of the
nation to which she belongs, and subjected exclusively to the jurisdiction
of that nation. 1f against the will of her master or owner, she be driven or
carried nearer to the land, or even into port... it would hardly be alleged
by anyone, that, by the mere force of such arrival within the waters of the
state, the law of that state would so attach to the vessel as to affect ex-
isting rights .... 50
Lord Ashburton's response was an agreement with the doctrine
of distress and jurisdiction over vessels: "Upon the great general
principles affecting this case we do not differ."51 But he differed
sharply with the circumstances attendant to the slaves:
You admit that if slaves, the property of American citizens, escape into
British territories, it is not expected that they will be restored; ... the
present state of British law is in this respect ... the same with the laws
of every part of the United States where a state of slavery is not recog-
nized; and that the slave put on shore at Nassau would be dealt with ex-
actly as would a foreign slave landed, under any circumstances whatever,
at Boston.
5 2
In the period following the Creole incident the controversy
nearly put an end to the important negotiations which led to the
Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842.53
Perhaps the strongest support for the doctrine of distress as an
all-encompassing exception comes from incidents involving bel-
ligerents.54 While instances of vessels of neutral nations being
50. Letter from Webster to Ashburton (Aug. 1, 1842), reprinted in 2 J. MOORE,
DIGEST, supra note 31, at 353-54.
51. 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST, supra note 31, at 355.
52. Id. An interesting speculation arises from considering the Enterprize or
Creole as ending up in Boston instead of in British colonies. The United States
Supreme Court might have faced the factual issue of acquired freedom for slaves
transported into free States in the relative calm of the early 1840's, and could pos-
sibly have avoided the later disastrous decision of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 393 (1857). See generally IL MCCLOSKEY, THE AmERICAN SUPREME
CouRT 91-97 (1960); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUIONAL LAW 416 (1978).
53. 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST, supra note 31, at 352.
54. Belligerency is a condition, express or implied, of war between two sover-
eign States, which carries with it legal entitlements With respect to third States.
An insurgency, on the other hand, is a domestic matter, and insurgents enjoy no
international entitlements. At some level of effectiveness, however, insurgents
may gain the status of belligerents, and be accorded international entitlements ex-
clusive of the parent government. See generally L LAuTERPAcHT, RECOGNITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 175-201 (1947 & photo. reprint 1978).
forced into a belligerent's port by distress have occurred,55 the
unrestricted use of the high seas by neutral vessels is generally
accepted. 56 The merchant ships of belligerents, however, may be
seized and confiscated by their adversaries anywhere at sea be-
yond neutral waters, and similarly, warships may be attacked.57
The privilege of belligerency obviously exists within the belliger-
ent's own territorial waters. Thus, the doctrine offorce majeure is
significantly enhanced by a holding that an enemy ship "which
seeks an asylum in distress should be released and not taken as
prize."58
Two incidents of belligerent entries in distress have been re-
ported.59 In 1799, during war with France, a Prussian merchant-
man forced to take refuge in Dunkirk was seized, but was
restored by the French Prize Court. But the quintessence of the
doctrine of distress was the case of the Elisabeth. In 1746, during
war with Spain, this British man-of-war was forced to take refuge
in Havana. She was not seized, but was instead offered repair fa-
cilities and given safe conduct to Bermuda.60
Recognition of the above cases as precedent by a court would
support an interpretation of the doctrine of distress as an all-en-
compassing exception and the only issue to be determined would
be the validity of the circumstances of the insurgent's distress to
establish the claim of necessity.61 If the distress claimed was fac-
tually established, the vessel would be immune from local juris-
diction regardless of any other factors.62
The High Seas Refuge
This approach limits the scope of the doctrine by considering
distress from its maritime perspective: the seeking of refuge in a
port when stress of weather, damage, mutiny or other unexpected
occurrence renders continued prosecution of the voyage on the
55. See, e.g., The Nuestra Senora de Regla, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 29 (1872); The Di-
ana, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 354 (1868); The Sunbeam, 23 F. Cas. 407 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1863)
(No. 13,615); The Major Barbour, 16 F. Cas. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 8,963).
56. See B. BRrm, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SEAGOING OFFICERS 217 (3d ed.
1972).
57. C. COLOmBOS, supra note 11, at 548.
58. P. JESSUP, supra note 22, at 207 (citing French sources).
59. See, e.g., 2 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 23, at 479 n.3.
60. Id.
61. The Eleanor, Edw. 135, 159, 165 Eng. Rep. 842, 1058 (1809).
62. Of necessity, there are some limitations on immunity, notably the health
and safety of the populace. A ship loaded with explosives and on fire, or a ship
carrying a highly contagious disease are examples. Additionally, a ship entering
port under conditions of distress must comply with local navigation regulations.
See M. MCDOUGALL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 110 (1962).
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high seas unacceptably dangerous or even impossible. 63 A condi-
tion of distress thus gives rise to a privilege of entry without be-
coming subject to local jurisdiction, but the privilege is available
only to those who rightfully navigate on the high seas. An excel-
lent summary of this approach is the statement of Bates, the um-
pire in the Creole case:
The Creole was on a voyage, sanctioned and protected by the laws of
the United States, and by the law of nations. Her right to navigate the
ocean could not be questioned, and as growing out of that right, the right
to seek shelter or enter the ports of a friendly power in case of distress or
any unavoidable necessity. 64
Whether a vessel that has proved actual distress or force
majeure can claim immunity from local jurisdiction turns on
whether the vessel had a lawful right to be on the high seas. If a
ship cannot be interfered with on the high seas by the coastal
State concerned, then the doctrine requires similar treatment by
the coastal State in cases of involuntary entry into that State's
waters under condition of distress. If, however, a vessel could be
lawfully interfered with on the high seas, then its "unprotected"
status could not be improved by a condition of distress.
Under the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, there are three
circumstances in which States, acting through warships, 65 may
seize or otherwise interfere with other66 ships: 67 (1) piracy (art.
19); (2) ships engaged in the slave trade (art. 22); and (3) state-
less vessels (art. 2, 4-6).68
63. See 2 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 277 (1941) (reference
to the doctrine of distress as "an exercise in large measure of those duties of hos-
pitality and humanity which all civilized nations impose upon themselves and ex-
pect the performance of from others .... "); The Eleanor, Edw. 135, 165 Eng. Rep.
842 (1809).
64. 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST, supra note 31, at 360.
65. High Seas Convention, supra note 2, arts. 8, 21-22.
66. Ships of a flag State are, of course, always subject to the jurisdiction of
that State. High Seas Convention, supra note 2, art. 6. See infra note 68.
67. The situation of belligerency is not included. It is well settled that bellig-
erency does not affect the basic legal status of the high seas, but only serves to
include another arena for hostilities between the belligerents. See generally C.
COLomBOs, supra note 11, § 496; B. BRrrrN, supra note 56, §§ 1000, 1010.
68. The relevant articles of the High Seas Convention, supra note 2, are as
follows:
Article 2
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to
subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is
exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the
The Law of the Sea Convention 69 made no significant changes
with respect to pirate ships or ships engaged in the slave trade,70
other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal
and non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general princi-
ples of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable
regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of
the high seas.
Article 4
Every State, whether coastal or not, has the right to sail ships under its
flag on the high seas.
Article 5
1. Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to
ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its
flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to
fly. There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship in
particular, the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control
in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.
2. Each State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly
its flag documents to that effect.
Article 6
1. Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in excep-
tional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in these ar-
ticles, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas. A
ship may not change its flag during a voyage or while in a port of call, save
in the case of a real transfer of ownership or change of registry.
2. A ship which sails under the flags of two or more States, using them
according to convenience, may not claim any of the nationalities in ques-
tion with respect to any other State, and may be assimilated to a ship
without nationality.
Article 19
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any
State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship taken by
piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize
the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the
seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also deter-
mine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property,
subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.
Article 22
1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by
treaty, a warship which encounters a foreign merchant ship on the high
seas is not justified in boarding her unless there is reasonable ground for
suspecting: (a) That the ship is engaged in piracy; or (b) That the ship is
engaged in the slave trade; or (c) That, though flying a foreign flag or re-
fusing to show its flag the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the
warship.
2. In the cases provided for in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) above,
the warship may proceed to verify the ship's right to fly its flag. To this
end, it may send a boat under the command of an officer to the suspected
ship. If suspicion remains after the documents have been checked, it may
proceed to a further examination on board the ship, which must be carried
out with all possible consideration.
3. If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship
boarded has not committed any act justifying them, it shall be compen-
sated for any loss or damage that may have been sustained.
69. See Convention, supra note 14.
70. Id. arts. 100-07, 110.
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but strengthened the sanctions regarding stateless vessels 71 and
added a new sanction against unauthorized broadcasting from the
high seas. 72 While broadcasting sanctions might well be relevant
to an insurgency, the other two of primary concern are piracy and
statelessness. Thus, the insurgent's claim of necessity due to dis-
tress orforce majeure would be upheld under the high seas ref-
uge approach if, after establishing the factual necessity, the
insurgent claimant was able to establish that the vessel in ques-
tion was neither a pirate nor stateless. 7 3 This additional require-
71. Id. Article 94 increases the administrative aspects (duties of the flag
state); article 110(d) authorizes a warship to board a ship suspected of being with-
out nationality.
72. Article 109 reads as follows:
1. All States shall co-operate in the suppression of unauthorized broad-
casting from the high seas.
2. Any person engaged in unauthorized broadcasting from the high seas
may be prosecuted before the court of the flag State of the vessel, the
place of registry of the installation, the State of which the person is a na-
tional, any place where the transmissions can be received or any State
where authorized radio communication is suffering interference.
3. On the high seas, a State having jurisdiction in accordance with para-
graph 2 may, in conformity with Article 110, arrest any person or ship en-
gaged in unauthorized broadcasting and seize the broadcasting apparatus.
4. For the purposes of this Convention, "unauthorized broadcasting"
means the transmission of sound radio or television broadcasts from a
ship or installation on the high seas intended for reception by the general
public contrary to international regulations, but excluding the transmis-
sion of distress calls.
Id..
73. A possible contention that the doctrine of distress or force majeure is
available only in instances where the two flag States involved have existing diplo-
matic relations is without real foundation, although such relations have been men-
tioned. See 2 J. MooRE, DIGEST, supra note 31, at 341-42 (discussing distress as
treaty provision); id. at 351 (mentioning "forced into port of friendly power").
There are three reasons why such a contention should fail: (1) recognition and
other diplomatic relations are discretionary and determined by political exigen-
cies, whereas the doctrine of distress is an outgrowth of man's use of the sea, and
is determined by humanitarian considerations; (2) recognition and diplomatic re-
lations (other than belligerency) do not affect freedom of the high seas, and thus
should not affect a determination under either approach; and (3) the 1958 Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, supra note 36, and the Conven-
tion, supra note 14, cannot be interpreted with recognition as a prerequisite. See
supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. See also Lowe, supra note 21, at 610,
(dismissing the recognition requirement based on humanitarian considerations,
but then limiting the distress doctrine to merchant ships). The exclusion of war-
ships does not appear supported by the authorities cited or by the humanitarian
foundation of the doctrine. At one time the dispute over right of innocent passage
by warships (see generally M. McDoUGAL & W. BuRKE, supra note 62, at 283-84, G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 20, at 83) may have supported such a premise, but
the recent Law of the Sea agreements have resolved this. See Convention, supra
note 14, arts. 17-19, 29-32.
ment is reasonable from both perspectives: that of the world
maritime community and that of the vessel involved. A pirate
ship cannot be tolerated, but the burden of proving piracy is on
the accuser. Stateless vessels are also not tolerated, and custom-
ary international law makes evidencing requirements by the ves-
sel minimal.74
In summary, a district court presented with a claim for immu-
nity from local jurisdiction by an insurgent vessel alleging entry
into port due to distress or force majeure would determine the
claim using the all-encompassing exception approach or the
somewhat limiting high seas refuge approach. The insurgent ves-
sel would, under the all encompassing exception approach, only
be required to establish its bona fide condition of distress. Under
the more restrictive high seas refuge approach, which is more in
consonance with the Law of the Sea Conventions, the ship would
additionally be required to establish its right to be on the high
seas. This right exists in the absence of conclusive evidence that
the ship is stateless, or is engaged in the internationally prohib-
ited acts of piracy, slave trading, or unauthorized broadcasting.
Referring to the scenario, the immunity of the insurgent warship
from local jurisdiction thus turns on disproving the ship as a pi-
rate or as stateless. The following sections consider these
questions.
INSURGENTS AND PIRACY
The problem presented by the scenario puts the vessel in ques-
tion under the close scrutiny of a district court. A more likely sit-
uation would involve the question of sanctions against an
insurgent warship on the high seas which is fully operational.
However, the distinction is insignificant, since a court must adju-
dicate the piracy question with respect to the vessel claiming dis-
tress from a high seas perspective.
An analysis of maritime insurgency as piracy should consider
three factors: (1) the interrelated duality of piracy as both a do-
mestic crime and as an offense against the law of nations; (2) the
'"private ends" requirement;75 and (3) intent as evidenced by se-
74. A logical consideration indicates why stateless vessels are inherently sus-
pect. Vessels not operated by States fall into two categories of principal use: law-
ful and unlawful. Private vessels engaged in lawful pursuits, such as fishing,
commerce, or pleasure cruising, must be registered to obtain insurance, clear and
enter port, and gain protection of a State. Thus, an unregistered vessel encoun-
tered on the high seas is not insured, has not cleared any port, and cannot enter
any port. See cases cited infra note 139.
75. "The private ends test does not have a precise definition, but generally an
act will be deemed to have a private end if it is without lawful authority and is
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lectivity of victims. The first factor, as developed through history
to codification in the Law of the Sea Convention, is important as a
gradual limitation of municipal jurisdiction. The other factors
serve to delineate the limited arena within which acts may be in-
surgency, but beyond which are piracy.
Historical Development of Sanctions Against Piracy in Domestic
and International Customary Law
Piracy has been a scourge of seafarers since the beginning of
recorded history.76 First noted as enemies of the whole human
community by the Romans,7 7 pirates have been historically sub-
jected to punishment by any State.78 Piracy is the only interna-
tional crime recognized by customary international law.79 The
first English statute dealing with pirates was the Offenses at Sea
Act of 1536,80 which established trial procedure but did not define
piracy. A 1698 statute included as pirates those persons commit-
ting piracy, robbery, or other hostility against British subjects
under color of foreign commission or pretence of authority. 81
In the United States, piracy was included in the list of congres-
sional concerns during the Constitutional Convention of 1787.82 In
1790, Congress enacted the Crimes Act,83 which made piracy a
statutory offense. A municipal and international distinction was
not made, with the result that a crime punishable by death within
one of the States would, if committed by any person on the high
committed for personal gain or revenge." Crockett, supra note 15, at 79. See infra
notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
76. The following are three excellent references on the legal history of piracy,
from which a great deal of the background in this section is drawn: Harvard Law
School, Research in International Law, Codification of International Law (Part IV,
Piracy), 26 Am. J. INT'L 740 (Supp. 1932) [hereinafter cited as Harvard: Draft Con-
vention ]; Harvard Law School, Research in International Law, Codification of In-
ternational Law (Part V, A Collection of Piracy Laws of Various Countries), 26
Am. J. INT'L L. 888 (Supp. 1932) [hereinafter cited as Harvard: Collection]; Sund-
berg, supra note 35.
77. See Sundberg, supra note 35, at 338.
78. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 590 (8th ed. 1955).
79. 1 A. McNAm, INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONs 265 (1956).
80. An Acte for Punysshement of Pyrotes and Robbers of the See, 28 Hen. 8,
ch. 15 (1536), in STATUTES OF THE REALM 671 (1817, reprinted 1963).
81. An Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy, 11 Will. 3, ch. 7 (1698),
in STATUiS OF THE REALM 590 (1820, reprinted 1963).
82. 5 ELuOT's DEBATES 543 (1845, reprinted 1937).
83. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112, 112-115.
seas, be punishable under the laws of the United States. 84 The
piracy sections of the act were patterned after the relevant British
statutes,8 5 and thus the United States conformed to the concept of
piracy as a special ground of State jurisdiction rather than a
crime against the law of nations.86 This distinction is important to
the high seas insurgent, because it potentially subjects him to thejurisdiction of any State based on acts defined by that State's mu-
nicipal laws, without regard to whether the insurgent's acts on the
high seas involved the State in question.
The first insurgency-piracy case decided by the Supreme Court
was United States v. Klintock.87 There the defendant was not ex-
empted from the charge of piracy by virtue of a "commission"
from a self-styled "Brigadier of the Mexican Republic."88 In dic-
tum clarifying the 1790 Act, Chief Justice Marshall distinguished
belligerencies, possibly to include insurgent acts:
Those general terms [piracy] ought not to be applied to offenses commit-
ted against the particular sovereignty of a foreign power; but we think
they ought to be applied to offenses committed against all nations, includ-
ing the United States, by persons who by common consent are equally
amenable to the laws of all nations.8 9
The Act of March 3, 181990 specifically extended United States
jurisdiction over those persons apprehended for "the crime of
piracy, as defined by the law of nations .... " This statute was
replaced by the Act of May 15, 1820,91 which made no reference to
the "law of nations," but defined a pirate as one committing rob-
84. Id.; see Harvard: Collection, supra note 76, at 893-99.
85. The contemporary British statute, the Piracy Act of 1721, 8 Geo. 1, ch. 24,
was only a minor amending of the 1698 statute, which in turn was based substan-
tially on the 1536 statute. See supra notes 80 & 81; Sundberg, supra note 35, at 345;
Harvard: Collection, supra note 76, at 910-12.
86. Properly speaking, then, piracy is not a legal crime or offence under
the law of nations. In this respect it differs from the municipal law piracy
which is a crime by the law of a certain state. International law piracy is
only a special ground of state jurisdiction-of jurisdiction in every state.
This jurisdiction may or may not be exercised by a certain state. It may
be used in part only. How far it is used depends on the municipal law of
the state, not on the law of nations. The law of nations on the matter is
permissive only. It justifies state action within limits and fixes those lim-
its. It goes no further. To think of piracy as a crime under the law of na-
tions, therefore, tends only to confuse the draftsman and an interpreter of
the draft convention. The proper purpose of a draft convention codifying
the international law of piracy is not to unify throughout the various mu-
nicipal laws of piracy, nor to provide uniform measures for punishing pi-
rates, but to define this extraordinary basis of state jurisdiction over
offences committed by foreigners against foreign interests outside the ter-
ritorial and other ordinary jurisdiction of the prosecuting state.
Harvard: Draft Convention, supra note 76, at 759-60.
87. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820).
88. Id. at 149.
89. Id. at 152.
90. Ch. 77, 3 Stat. 510.
91. Ch. 113, 3 Stat. 600.
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bery on the high seas.92
Two insurgent cases of the period made reference to the law of
nations, but relied on municipal law. In United States v. Baker,9 3
which involved the indictment of the officers and crew of the Con-
federate cruiser Savannah, the court held that, since the evidence
showed intent to depredate only United States vessels and prop-
erty, the defendants could not be found guilty of piracy under the
law of nations. 94 The other case arose out of an incident during
the ongoing insurrection against Spanish rule in Cuba. In 1873,
Cuban insurgents obtained a vessel and registered it in the
United States as the Virginius. While flying the American flag, it
was seized on the high seas by a Spanish cruiser, and taken to
Cuba. Fifty-three of the persons on board, including American
and British citizens, were tried for piracy by Spanish court-mar-
tial, and shot.9 5 The Virginius case illustrates the grave problems
inherent when individual nations adopt the special jurisdiction
doctrine to consider allegations of piracy on the high seas.96 In
essence the ship had committed no act of violence on the high
seas and, while admittedly part of a mission to violate Spanish
municipal law, the violative actions could not reach fruition until
the ship had left the high seas and was within Cuban waters. The
Virginius was thus "more innocent" of piracy than the Savannah,
but the standards applied to the Virginius' crew were different.9 7
In 1873 it could thus be said that a pirate was a ship seized on the
high seas and adjudged a pirate strictly under the laws of the ap-
prehending State, even though, paradoxically, the basis for
seizure was that the pirate was "hostis generis humani." Of note
was Congress' resurrection, in 1874, of the 1819 provision for pun-
ishing piracy "as defined by the law of nations."98
The British experience with insurgency during this period was
92. Id. The Act also defined piracy to include landing ashore from a ship and
committing depredations, and included provisions regarding the slave trade.
93. 24 F. Cas. 962 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 14,501).
94. Id. at 965. However, the court held that the defendants could be tried for
statutory offenses. Id.
95. See, e.g., 1 C. HYDE, supra note 30, at 244.
96. See supra note 86.
97. The "high seas-courtroom" analysis is useful at this point. The Savannah
court, in essence, removed itself to the high seas and found no violation of interna-
tional law by the ship. The Virginius tribunal, conversely, brought the high seas
under its jurisdiction and found a violation of municipal law.
98. Rev. Stat. Sec. 5368 (repealed and re-enacted Act of Mar. 4, 1909, §§ 290-310,
35 Stat. 1088, 1145-1148).
more involved. In 1821, during a rebellion of the Greeks against
Turkey, a foreign office report advised that: "It would not be
proper to consider persons as pirates who may be cruzing under a
State of alleged hostilities whether regular or irregular, provided
their intentions were in fact satisfactorily distinguished from the
mere predatory character of piracy, as considered in law."99
In 1832, during the struggle for the Falkland Islands, the United
States ship Lexington, in response to theseizure of an American
whaler by the appointed governor of Buenos Aires, landed a force,
destroyed a fort, and took off several persons to have them tried
for piracy. One of those seized was a British subject, and, al-
though the British challenged the Buenos Aires sovereignty of
the islands,100 they denounced any charge of piracy, as the Briton
was acting under orders of a regular and acknowledged
government.101
In 1848, British authorities would not comply with a request of
the Venezuelan government to seize a rebel ship as a pirate. 0 2
However, during an 1870 Venezuelan rebellion, after a British
merchant ship was attacked and plundered by a rebel warship, a
charge of piracy was considered appropriate. 0 3 The British prac-
tice, therefore, was to leave alone those unrecognized insurgent
warships as long as they did not molest third State ships, subjects
or commerce. This practice was further illustrated by incidents
involving Spanish rebels 0 4 and the celebrated affair of the Peru-
99. 1 A. McNAr, supra note 79, at 267.
100. The Falkland Islands are an example of the impact of the Law of the Sea
negotiations on old controversies. Great Britain and Spain maintained struggling
settlements in the late 18th century, with the British abandoning their garrison
(but not their claim) in 1774 and Spain leaving theirs in 1810. In 1829 the new state
of Buenos Aires commissioned a Governor for the Falklands, with a private mo-
nopoly over the valuable whaling and sealing rights. An attempt to exercise this
monopoly invoked the American reaction in 1832. 1 A. McNAm, supra note 79, at
268. The British, apparently sensing an American takeover of the islands and con-
trol of south Atlantic fishing and sealing, reinstated its claim and garrison, displac-
ing the Argentines. The British maintained control and developed the islands
without incident until the late 1950's. As the new regime of the sea began to un-
fold, the Falklands became an increasingly obvious Argentine key to ocean wealth
under continental shelf and exclusive economic zone concepts. After lengthy and
fruitless negotiations the issue erupted into the 1982 war. See THE ECONOMIST,
Apr. 10, 1982, at 27. During their brief occupation of the islands the Argentine for-
eign minister stated: "there is something much more important than national
pride. The meaning of the Argentine presence in the islands is that Argentina
controls an area in the South Atlantic, politically and economically .... " THE
ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 1982, at 14.
101. 1 A. McNAnt, supra note 79, at 268.
102. Id. at 270. A similar problem involving the rebellion of Venice against Aus-
tria occurred the same year. Id. at 271.
103. Id. at 272-73.
104. Id.
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vian insurgent ship Huascar.0 5
An American case in 1885 sought to define a threshhold for en-
try by insurgents onto the high seas. 106 The rebel cruiser Am-
brose Light was seized by a United States warship off Colombia.
In the belief that her insurgent commission was irregular, the
cruiser was brought into the United States and claimed by the
government to be forfeit, as a pirate, under the law of nations.
The lengthy circuit court opinion turned on a single issue:
[T]he liability of the vessel to seizure, as piratical, turns wholly upon the
question whether the insurgents had or had not obtained any previous
recognition of belligerent rights, either from their own government or
from... any other nation; and, that, in the absence of recognition by any
government whatever, the tribunals of other nations must hold such expe-
ditions as this to be technically piratical.
10 7
The Ambrose Light is instructive for a number of reasons: (1) it
is the most thorough attempt to formulate a legal threshhold for
dealing with insurgent warships; (2) it attempted to distinguish
the in rem suit from criminal proceedings against the crew for
piracy, reaching a puzzling conclusion that a vessel could be con-
demned as a pirate but the crew not found guilty of piracy1 08
(3) it attempts to expand the classic concept of piracy as "sea rob-
bery" to include any "unauthorized" maritime warfare 109 and
(4) it essentially allows the executive and judicial departments to
"define and punish piracies on the high seas" contrary to article I,
section 8 of the Constitution." 0 The decision, however, has been
105. The Huascar had been seized by Peruvian insurgents in 1877, and, without
flying colors, stopped three British ships, taking mail, coal, Peruvian officials, and
a British engineer. A British naval squadron attacked and damaged the Huascar,
which escaped and surrendered to the Peruvian government. Peru later de-
manded satisfaction from the British for "outrages" committed on the Huascar.
The British refusal was based on a prior Peruvian disavowal of the acts of the re-
bel ship, and on the depredations caused by the ship against a third State. Id at
274-80.
106. The Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1885).
107. Id. at 412.
108. Id. at 415.
109. Id. at 416.
110. None of the statutes expressly included insurgents. See Harvard. Collec-
tion, supra note 76, at 893-99 and references cited therein. The Ambrose Light
opinion refers to "piracy in the view of international law." 25 F. at 412. Judge
Brown included unrecognized rebels within the international definition of piracy
and held that any form of diplomatic recognition is a political function of the exec-
utive department. Thus the holding "that in the absence of recognition by any
government of their belligerent rights, insurgents that sendcout vessels of war are
... private persons engaged in unlawful depredations on the high seas.., such
acts are therefore piratical .... " Id. at 412-13. The word "any" preceding "gov-
largely discredited."'
Subsequently, the United States rejected decrees by Venezuela
in 1885, Haiti in 1889, and Chile in 1891 declaring insurgent vessels
as pirates,11 2 and a Navy task force was ordered not to interfere
with insurgent vessels unless their acts were directed against
Americans." 3
Two incidents prior to World War II maintained the concern
over piracy in the twentieth century. In 1929 the Venezuelan gov-
ernment requested American and British authorities to declare as
a pirate the S.S. Falke," 4 which made one abortive raid before
putting into Trinidad without coal or funds to purchase it. The in-
cident fizzled out when the British flatly refused to consider the
ship a pirate, choosing instead to label such behavior as "a filibus-
tering expedition .... ,115 During the Spanish Civil War, most of
the Mediterranean powers signed the Nyon Arrangements11 6
treating attacks on neutral merchant shipping as piratical. The
Nyon Arrangements have been criticized.17 In considering the
doctrinal concept involved, the Nyon Arrangements might well be
viewed as a multi-lateral extension of jurisdiction, giving the sig-
natories nearly municipal authority over the Mediterranean.
eminent" does not affect this issue: the executive department ascertains the de
facto insurgency and recognition by other governments, as well as declaring or
withholding United States recognition.
111. The strongest rejection of the opinion was by the very person to whom the
opinion deferred: less than three months after the opinion, President Cleveland
declared that insurgent vessels could not be considered "hostis humani generis
within the precepts of international law," and Secretary of State Bayard de-
nounced the incident as an unauthorized intervention in the domestic strife in Co-
lumbia. T. CHEN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION 403 (1951). The
preeminent commentary on piracy noted the opinion as "different," expressed
doubt as to its conformity with established international law, and noted as proper
the expressed reluctance of the United States to so conduct itself. Harvard: Draft
Convention, supra note 76, at 858-59. In 1929, the State Department flatly stated:
"Notwithstanding the decision... in the Ambrose Light ... the weight of opinion
is clearly to the effect that an insurgent vessel cannot be treated as piratical
merely because the insurgents have not been recognized as belligerents." See 2 G.
HACKWORTH, supra note 63, at 697.
112. Green, The Santa Maria: Rebels or Pirates?, 37 BrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 496, 501
(1961).
113. Id. at 502.
114. 2 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 63, at 698-99.
115. Id. at 699.
116. International Agreement for Collective Measures against Piratical Attacks
in the Mediterranean by Submarines, Sept. 14, 1937, 181 IN.T.S. 135; International
Agreement for Collective Measures Against Piratical Attacks in the Mediterranean
by Surface Vessels and Aircraft, Sept. 17, 1937, 181 LN.T.S. 149.
117. See H. LAUTERPAcHT, supra note 54, at 295-96; Finch, Piracy in the Mediter-
ranean, 31 Aje. J. IN'L L. 659 (1937); Genet, The Charge of Piracy in the Spanish
Civil War, 32 Am. J. INT'L L. 253 (1938).
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Codification of Piracy: From the Law of Nations to the Law of
the Sea
When the first Conference on the Law of the Sea convened in
1958, the inquiry should perhaps have addressed the further need
for codification of piracy, since the days of buccaneers roaming
the seas had long since passed.18 In fact, Uruguay proposed dele-
tion of the piracy articles of the Draft Convention partly on the
ground that piracy no longer constituted a general problem." 9
Nevertheless, the Conference did codify international law on
piracy.120 The piracy articles were based largely on the 1932
Harvard Draft Convention.121 With respect to insurgents the cor-
nerstone of the definition of piracy is the "private ends" require-
ment, which excludes acts committed for public or even political
ends from treatment as piratical. Originally appearing in article 3
of the Harvard Draft,122 the private ends clause carried over to ar-
ticle 15 of the 1958 Convention. The inclusion of the private ends
requirement was not accomplished without debate. An Albanian-
Czechoslovak revision which would have accommodated "Piracy
for Political Reasons" was proposed and rejected.123 The most in-
tense objection to the private ends requirement came from the
Soviet Union. Angered over the harassment by Nationalist Chi-
nese warships of vessels destined for Communist Chinese ports,
the Soviet Union sought to expand the definition of piracy to in-
clude unlawful actions by State vessels on the high seas. The pro-
posal was overwhelmingly rejected.124 The private ends
requirement is thus firmly established in international law.125
118. See H. LAiTERPACHT, supra note 54, at 307; Dickinson, Is the Crime of
Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HARv. L. REV. 334 (1925); Harvard: Draft Convention, supra
note 76, at 764.
119. 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 661 (1963).
120. High Seas Convention, supra note 2, arts. 14-22.
121. Sundberg, supra note 35; accord Crockett, supra note 15, at 83-84.
122. Harvard: Draft Convention, supra note 76, at 798.
123. 4 M. WHrrEMAN, supra note 119.
124. Id. at 662; see also W. BUTLER, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
181-82 (1971); M. McDoUGAL & W. BuRKE, supra note 62, at 818-21.
125. In its first test, the 1958 Convention was strained by those nations endors-
ing the private ends requirement. On January 23, 1961, the Portuguese liner Santa
Maria was seized by a dissident group while on the high seas in the Caribbean.
Portugal immediately requested British, Dutch, and American assistance to re-
cover the vessel from the "pirates." The three governments responded, with both
British and United States announcements implying the act was clearly piracy.
Following the brief control by the rebels, who claimed to be supporters of the anti-
Salazar party of General Delgado, and an uneventful surrender of the ship in Bra-
At the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
the Convention incorporated the piracy articles virtually un-
changed. 126 A new element has, however, been added to the regu-
lation of piracy. As noted by Dubner,27 there are still unresolved
jurisdictional questions concerning the expanded Territorial Seas,
Contiguous Zone, and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Al-
though article 58 incorporates the piracy articles, it leaves the
coastal State with regulatory authority over the exploitation of re-
sources in the EEZ. Overshadowing all other considerations is
the basic character of the economic zone as a resource base of the
coastal State. In the context of an insurgency within a coastal
State, such as that described in the scenario of this Comment, the
EEZ assumes a character more analogous to territory than to
high seas. The result is that a third State, observing a coastal
State government and an adversary insurgent movement in mari-
time conflict over the assets of the economic zone, cannot con-
sider the insurgent as operating on the high seas. 28
Conclusions with Respect to Insurgents and Piracy
Until the formulation of the international rules for accommodat-
ing the exploitation of the sea, the regulation of piracy was a mu-
tual acceptance of the jurisdiction of all nations to prosecute
piracy on the high seas under municipal law. The 1958 Conven-
tion on the High Seas, and its successor, the 1982 Convention,
have replaced the extended jurisdiction concept with an interna-
zil, the governments quickly forgot the incident and left the controversy to the
commentators. See C. CoLoinos, supra note 11, at 445-46; M. McDouGAL & W.
BURKE, supra note 62, at 821-23; Dubner, The Law of International Sea Piracy, 11
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 471, 483-84 (1979); Fenwick, 'Piracy' in the Caribbean, 55
AM. J. INT'L L. 426 (1961); Green, supra note 112; Sundberg, supra note 35, at 374-75.
Professor Fenwick supports the label of piracy based on the presence of third-
state nationals on the ship, the fact that the seizure itself "began" the rebellion,
the failure of the seizure, and the fact that the group leader held no public office.
Sundberg favors Fenwick's position. Professor Green derides Fenwick's thesis,
noting the pure political nature of the act against the framework of political reali-
ties in Portugal. The others support the political and therefore non-piracy nature
of the act. A persuasive notion is that of Crockett, supra note 15, at 94-95, who
notes the scholarly debate and subordinates it to the "broader and less tangible
interests" of the maritime powers involved.
126. Convention, supra note 14.
127. Dubner, supra note 125, at 477-80.
128. Some technical problems arise elsewhere. For example, the Convention,
supra note 14, prohibits non-transit activities by ships and aircraft exercising
transit passage through straits. I&L art. 39. This would appear to preclude a tran-
siting warship from acting against a pirate vessel in a strait. Even stricter prohibi-
tions exist for archipelagic waters, under article 52. This is of more than academic
concern, for two areas with inordinate pirate activity are Indonesia and the Philip-
pines. See M. McDOUGAL & W. Bu=KE, supra note 62, at 16 n.43; Dubner, supra
note 125, at 474.
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tional codification. Thus, while regulation of municipal or statu-
tory piracy may be continued for those persons and vessels
within the jurisdiction of the State, a piracy prosecution involving
persons and vessels outside its municipal jurisdiction must com-
ply with the articles of the 1958 High Seas Convention. The result
appears to be that, in the absence of evidence of depredations of
third State ships, property, or persons on the high seas, third
States cannot prosecute insurgent warships as pirates. 2 9 In the
scenario of this Comment, the district court should find that the
insurgent warship was not a pirate. Consequently, the claim for
jurisdictional immunity based on distress should go forward.
INSURGENT WARSHIPS AS STATELESS VESSELS
1 3 0
The traditional view of international law is that only States can
be its subjects; individuals are only its objects.131 This is reflected
in maritime law by the principle that only States may operate
ships on the high seas.132 The corollary of this principle is that
every vessel sailing the high seas must fly the flag of some na-
tion.133 As noted by one commentator.
The entire legal system which States have evolved for the regulation of
the use of the high seas is predicated on the possession by each vessel of
a connection with a State having a recognized maritime flag. This connec-
tion has been commonly called nationality. The lack of nationality, which
might better be termed "statelessness," robs a ship of privileges, and de-
prives it of a State to espouse its cause when it suffers injustice at the
hands of another State. Even the privilege of clearing port may be denied
the stateless vessel .... It is by this control of their ports that States, in
129. As an example, the sole section for prosecuting non-citizens accused of
piracy not involving United States citizens or property is 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976),
which uses a "law of nations" definition. Of necessity this incorporates article 15
of the High Seas Convention, supra note 2, and, accordingly, the private ends
requirement.
130. The overall concept of statehood as legal acceptance by the international
community involves complex principles which, considering the scope of this
Comment, must be addressed only superficially. The material herein was drawn
principally from the following general works: T. CHEN, supra note 111, chs. 19-26;
C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBUC INTERNATIONAL LAw (P. Corbett
trans. 4th ed. 1978); J. HERVEY, THE LEGAL EFFEcTS OF RECOGNITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 54-80 (1928); P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS ch. 3
(1968); H. LAUTERPAcHr, INTERNATIONAL LAW chs. 3, 6 (E. Lauterpacht ed. 1970); IL
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 54; 1 A. McNAIR, supra note 79; 1 M. WHrEAN, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 2 (1963); Lansing, Notes on Sovereignty in a State (pts. 1
& 2), 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 105, 297 (1907).
131. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 130, at 136.
132. See supra notes 65, 68.
133. H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAw OF THE SUPREME COURT 619 (1979).
practice, clear the high seas of nondescript vessels.1 3 4
The ultimate loss of privilege referred to above is seizure on the
high seas; a "stateless" vessel is without State protection. The de-
finitive case in this area is Molvan v. Attorney General For Pales-
tine,135 which involved the post-World War II movement of Jews
into Palestine. A British destroyer patrolling the high seas en-
countered the Asya, which was flying no flag.13 6 Suspecting a
possible attempt to violate the immigration laws of the Man-
date, 3 7 the vessel was boarded and, upon finding 733 unlawful im-
migrants, the British seized the vessel and escorted it to Haifa.
The vessel was forfeited, and on appeal by the owner the Privy
Council affirmed. Lord Simond's opinion included the following:
[T]he appellant has invoked the doctrine which is called "the freedom of
the open sea", alleging that under the shield of that doctrine the Asya was
entitled, whatever her mission might be, to sail the open sea off the coast
of Palestine .... [No] such right, unqualified by place or circumstance,
is established by international law .... [T]he freedom of the open sea,
whatever those words may connote, is a freedom of ships which fly, and
are entitled to fly, the flag of a State which is within the cority of nations.
The Asya did not satisfy these elementary conditions ..... 13
Molvan has been followed in numerous cases of high seas
seizure of stateless vessels by States seeking to enforce municipal
law. 3 9 This principle of law has been codified in the Law of the
Sea Convention.140
Insurgents and Statehood
The focus of an inquiry involving an insurgent vessel is not so
much on the ship but on the "State" itself.141 In order to be enti-
tled to "sail ships of its flag on the high seas," the insurgent or-
ganization must have either an independent right to function as a
sovereign entity within the world community of nations, or else a
134. M. RIENOw, TEST OF THE NATIONAIrY OF A MERCHANT VESSEL 12-15 (1937).
135. Naim Molvan v. Attorney-General for Palestine [The "Asya"], 1948 A.C.
351; 81 Lloyd's List L.R. 277 (1948).
136. The ship hoisted a Turkish flag, then a Zionist flag as the destroyer ap-
proached. Id. at 352.
137. At the time, Palestine was administered by Great Britain under the Man-
date system established by article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
See generally 3 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 29-110 (E. Lauterpacht ed.
1977) (collected papers).
138. 1948 A.C. at 369-70.
139. Recent United States cases have targeted "stateless" drug smuggling ves-
sels. See United States v. Monroy, 614 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Cor-
tez, 588 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Rubies, 612 F.2d 397 (9th Cir.
1979).
140. The Convention, supra note 14, art. 110 § I(d), includes permissive board-
ing of foreign ships by warships, based on reasonable grounds of suspecting that
the ship is without nationality.
141. A collateral question involving "warship" criteria is covered by the High
Seas Convention, supra note 2, art. 8.
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lawful claim to exercise the rights of the parent government, hos-
tile to its desires, absent the parent government's capability to ex-
tinguish that claim by force. 42 Before considering these
alternatives, the basic concepts should be briefly discussed.
Statehood
The "State" as an entity has been defined as a "particular por-
tion of mankind viewed as an organized unit." 43 An early com-
mentator noted that publicists tended to expand concepts of the
State by adding qualifications, most notably a fixed territorial
abode and a large population.144 To these he replied: "in the con-
sideration of sovereignty, the state as an organized community of
individuals is of importance. In fact, the qualification of occupa-
tion of territory is ... nonessential .... The same objection ap-
plies to the requirement as to numbers ... ."145
International efforts have nonetheless tended to orient towards
qualifications, most notably: (a) a permanent population; (b) a
defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into
relations with the other States. 4 6
To resolve these differences, Lansing draws a distinction be-
tween the political State and the territorial State.147 The commu-
nity of human beings united as an entity can thus be considered
as a political unit even though displaced from or held captive
within their traditional territory. The territorial State is of impor-
tance only with respect to the political State. In light of contem-
porary examples, Lansing's 1907 descriptions are particularly
apt.14
Sovereignty
The two traditional concepts of sovereignty are: (1) sovereign
142. See generally Wilson, Insurgency and Maritime Law, 1 Am. J. INT'L L, 46
(1907).
143. 1 BURGESS, PoIrrcAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 51
(quoted in Lansing, supra note 130, at 108).
144. Lansing, supra note 130, at 108.
145. Id.
146. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, supra note 3, art. 1.
147. Lansing, supra note 130, at 109.
148. For example, if the territorial requirement of statehood is valid, how can
one reconcile the recognition of Palestinian statehood? See Comment, supra note
6. With respect to the population requirement, consider the Holy See. See K.
ScHusc=NGG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 89-90 (1959).
power originates in the people themselves who control their gov-
ernment, and (2) sovereign power exists in a personage, and flows
down as grants to the populace.149 A more helpful view, however,
holds sovereignty as simply the supreme coercive power in a
State, which rests on material force and is exercised by the pos-
sessor. 5 0 This latter view is most appropriate for third States
and others outside the civil strife to consider the sovereignty is-
sues involved in the insurgency.
Successful popular revolutions and the suppression of rebel-
lions are the manifestations of the real sovereignty in a State.
Both are coercive in character, both compel obedience, and both
require the exercise of superior physical strength, including in
that term the use of weapons of war, military skill, discipline and
equipment.'15
From the perspective of third States, the first consideration is
whether the State concerned has the "possessor of sovereignty"
within it (as opposed, for example, to a colony, or a State occu-
pied by a hostile force). The second consideration, which internal
possessor, arises in the event of civil strife:
When... a state of civil war exists, there may be... two distinct govern-
ments, each of which claims to be the true and sole agent of the sovereign
.... In these circumstances... other states... may declare... uncer-
tainty by recognizing the legal right of the government which prior to the
war represented the sovereign, and the belligerent right of the other,
which denies the authority of the older government to act for the sover-
eign, and is attempting by force to disprove such authority. By this course
a foreign sovereign or government remains non-committal, neutral, until
the real sovereign by exercising superior physical might manifests which
of the rival governments is its true agent.152
The nature of the internal struggle must be considered, so that
foreign governments would not react to mere banditry. At the
1949 Diplomatic Conference in Geneva, an attempt was made to
define "armed conflict" that was not of an international character.
Although not adopted, the criteria were considered indicative of
an insurgency which had achieved belligerent status. They essen-
tially required the insurgents to (1) possess the internal and ex-
ternal attributes plus the manifestations of conduct
commensurate with a State, and (2) be effectively beyond the
control of the parent government to such extent as to cause ex-
press or implied recognition by it.53
149. 1 M. WHrmEAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 583 (1963).
150. Lansing, supra note 130, at 111.
151. Id. at 121.
152. Id. at 298-99.
153. Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva 1949, vol. H-B, at 121
(quoted in 10 M. WHrrmriA, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 40-41 (1963)). The spe-
cific criteria are:
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The requirement for control of a determinate part of the na-
tional territory'54 presents difficulties in two instances: (1) where
the insurrection is conducted, in essence, from outside the "terri-
torial State;" and (2) where the insurrection is conducted within
the extensive maritime zones created by the Law of the Sea Con-
vention. Since no precedents as yet exist for the latter, the for-
mer is possibly instructive. While crossborder insurrections have
occurred in several States, 5 5 the example of the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization (PLO) is a continuing precedent. 56 The PLO
has been recognized, not only by numerous States, but also by
the United Nations, 5 7 as the representative of the Palestinian
people, and thus entitled to international rights and duties as a
"quasi-State."' 58 Thus while not satisfying the criteria for state-
hood, 59 the "State" is created in international law. In this respect
(1) that the Party in revolt against the de jure Government possesses an
organized military force, an authority responsible for its acts, acting
within a determinate territory and having the means of respecting and en-
suring respect for the Convention. (2) that the legal Government is
obliged to have recourse to the regular military forces against the insur-
gents organized as military and in possession of a part of the national ter-
ritory. (3) (a) that the de jure Government has recognized the insurgents
as belligerents; or (b) that it has claimed for itself the rights of a belliger-
ent; or (c) that it has accorded the insurgents recognition as belligerents
for the purposes only of the present Convention; or (d) that the dispute
has been admitted to the agenda of the Security Council or the General
Assembly of the United Nations as being a threat to international peace, a
breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. (4) (a) that the insurgents
have an organization purporting to have the characteristics of a State.
(b) that the insurgent civil authority exercises defacto authority over per-
sons within a determinate territory. (c) that the armed forces act under
the direction of the organized civil authority prepared to observe the ordi-
nary laws of war. (d) that the insurgent civil authority agrees to be bound
by the provisions of the Convention. The above criteria are useful as a
means of distinguishing a genuine armed conflict from a mere act of ban-
ditry or an unorganized and shortlived insurrection.
154. Id.
155. See O'Neill, supra note 4. The Vietnam War is another example of a cross-
border insurrection. While the Viet Cong insurgents exercised a great deal of con-
trol over the populace, they were highly transitory, and no definite identifiable
territory was under continuing insurgent control. The Viet Cong operated from
sanctuaries, primarily in Cambodia, which ultimately led to the 1970 United States
decision to attack their sanctuaries. See Address to the Nation on the Situation in
Southeast Asia, 1970 PuB. PAPERS OF RicHARD NIXON 405 (Apr. 30, 1970).
156. See Comment, supra note 6. Other "subjugated" people have been noted
by the United Nations. See Legitimizing Self Determination Struggles of Various
Southern Africa Peoples, G-A. Res. 2787, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 82-83,
U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971).
157. Comment, supra note 6, at 454.
158. Id. at 456.
159. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
recognition is all important. A true State, with internal sover-
eignty, exists with or without recognition,16o and recognition only
serves to legitimatize international relations.161 The quasi-State,
however, lacks sovereignty. If any '"power" exists in the quasi-
State, it is that which is granted by foreign States in the form of
recognition.162 The same is true of the so-called government-in-
exile.163 Some important distinctions, however, also apply to rec-
ognition of any insurgent group. Utilizing the two-State view of
Lansing, 64 the World War 1[ governments in exile were the sover-
eign power of the political State. The Nazis were the sovereign
power of the territorial State, and were contested in this by the
various resistance efforts associated with the government-in-exile,
which, in turn were recognized as belligerents by the Allies. The
PLO is similarly recognized as the sovereign government of the
political State, and as an insurgent with respect to the territorial
State. The insurgency in this Comment's scenario, however,
should not be recognized as sovereign of the political State, for
that is at issue. Further, it should not be recognized as a belliger-
ent to the territorial State, for there is no belligerency, absent
control of some definite territory. To be recognized as a belliger-
ent would require consideration of the maritime jurisdictional
zones of the State as part of its national territory and recognize
the effective control over a significant part of these zones by the
insurgents. Such a situation, of course, presents difficulties:
(1) occupation and control are, by the nature of a maritime area,
fleeting; (2) there is no permanent "population" therein; and
(3) the maritime areas could not constitute a separate State. 65
Central to the concern of other States is, of course, jurisdiction
160. This is the declaratory view of recognition. See generally H. LAuTERPACHT,
supra note 54, at 41.
161. Id. at 42.
162. Thus a quasi-State can only exist under the constitutive view of recogni-
tion. Id. at 38-39.
163. See 1 M. WHrrEMAN, supra note 149, at 921-30. There were nine "govern-
ments-in-exile" in London during the Nazi occupation of Europe. Six (Norway,
Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and the Netherlands) were occupied
by co-belligerents with continuing recognition. The governments of Czechoslova-
kia and Poland were recognized as created ab origine. The Free French were not
recognized as the de jure government of France, but as a de facto governmental
institution. See also H. KELSEN, supra note 29, at 410-12; 2 M. WHrEMAN, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 467-86 (1963).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48.
165. This concept of insurgency as the establishment of an independent inter-
nal State which is contesting the established internal State for overall control is
favorably noted by commentators. See H. LAUTERPAciTr, supra note 54, at 177; P.
JESSUP, supra note 130, at 53; M. SORENSEN, MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
287-88; Bundu, Recognition of Revolutionary Authorities: Law and Practice of
States, 27 INT'L & Co ip. LQ. 18, 25, 42 (1978). But cf. H. LAuTERPACHT, supra note
54, at 279-80.
654
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over vessels in the maritime zones. States have no inherent right
to conduct commerce on the land territory of another State, so the
"interference" caused by a classic insurgency is legally non-exis-
tent. When the insurgency spills over into the maritime area,
however, other States are affected. The American, Cuban, and
Spanish Civil Wars are examples of insurgencies extending to
even the high seas.1 66
The Law of the Sea Conferences have created a new regime for
the ocean areas which must be considered from the perspective of
a maritime-oriented insurgency. Under the provisions of the 1982
Convention the coastal State enjoys the exclusive right to exploit
the resources of the economic zone to a limit of 200 miles 67 and
those of the continental shelf extending out to possibly 350
miles.168 Foreign interests, such as fishing concerns or oil compa-
nies, can participate in this exploitation only within a legal frame-
work created by the coastal State. The existence of an effective
maritime insurgency, such as in the scenario, renders such a re-
gime impossible. Indeed, a foreign fishing concern might seek out
an exploitation arrangement with the insurgents, and the benefit
to the insurgents, besides monetary royalties, would be an in-
creased basis for international recognition. 6 9
Recognition itself is a complex international concept.17 0 With
respect to an insurgent warship, two questions arise. First, is the
warship of an unrecognized insurgency stateless? Second, to
what extent does recognition of an insurgency by a third State af-
fect treatment of an insurgent warship by other States?17'
166. See generally T. CHEN, supra note 111, at 342-48; H. LArERPAcrT, supra
note 54, at 250-53; 1 A. McNAEi, supra note 79, at 385ff; Wilson, supra note 142, at 46.
167. Convention, supra note 14, arts. 55-57.
168. Id. arts. 76-77.
169. For an example of payments to insurgent governments see 1 M. WHmEw,
supra note 149, at 920, concerning the Indonesian Civil War. In 1958, discussing
payment of taxes by American firms on Sumatra to the rebel forces controlling Su-
matra, the Department of State took the view that de facto insurgent authorities
could properly compel such payment, thus relieving the firms of payment of simi-
lar taxes to the central government.
170. See generally authorities cited, supra note 130 (concept of statehood).
171. The principal consequence of a recognition of insurgency is to protect
the insurgents from having their warlike activities, especially on the high
seas, from being regarded as lawless acts of violence which, in the ab-
sence of recognition, might subject them to treatment as pirates. It may
also sharpen the obligation of third states with respect to their duty of
nonintervention in the conflict.
P. JESSUp, supra note 130, at 53.
The constitutive view of recognition, which considers States to
exist in international law solely by virtue of recognition by other
States, includes a perceived obligation for recognition when cir-
cumstances warrant. 7 2 However, it is well settled in interna-
tional law that recognition is a totally discretionary act of a
sovereign State.l73 Thus, without such discretionary exercise, an
insurgent warship would remain stateless. In the maritime sense,
however, "stateless" is an absolute term, not one which merely
reflects absence of recognition by the forum State.174 The courts
of the United States have noted this difference also, distinguish-
ing insurgents unrecognized by any State: "From these principles
it necessarily follows that in the absence of recognition by any
government of their belligerent rights, insurgents that send out
vessels of war are in legal contemplation, merely combinations of
private persons engaged in unlawful depredations on the high
seas .... "175 Since the existence of an insurgency can occur
without formal recognition by the political department, it follows
that the courts must take judicial notice of it if the laws of the
United States are to be enforced. 7 6
Recognition of insurgency is not a precisely defined status,177
but rather a domestic proclamation alerting the public to circum-
stances in a foreign State which merit special caution.178 The
measure of such recognition is thus the effectiveness of the insur-
gents, and what is recognized is their effectiveness.179
The very fact that an insurgent warship sails in defiance of the
de jure government is evidence of the unsettled sovereignty of
that State. The insurgent warship, then, cannot be stateless,
since it is an essential part of the political State, necessary to as-
certain the possessor of the sovereignty of that State.180
172. See H. LAuTERPAcHT, supra note 54, chs. 3-4.
173. See T. CHEN, supra note 111, at 352-63. Accord J. HERVEY, supra note 130,
at 54; P. JEsSuP, supra note 130, at 55; IVL SORENSEN, supra note 165, at 286.
174. See supra text accompanying note 162.
175. United States v. The Ambrose Light, 25 F. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1885).
176. United States v. The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 63, 65 (1898).
177. H. LAUTERPAcHT, supra note 54, at 270.
178. T. CHEN, supra note 111, at 400.
179. Thus, L LAuTERPAcHT, supra note 54, at 293-94, draws a distinction
between defacto and de jure recognition of insurgent governments.
180. A related question arising from the High Seas Convention, supra note 2,
and the Convention, supra note 14, is the potential conflict between the articles
prescribing immunity of warships and those authorizing right of visit. Id. arts. 29,
95, 110. An attempt by a third State warship to exercise right of visit on a "ship
without nationality" must be resisted by an insurgent warship, in order to pre-
serve the status of both the ship and the insurgent government.
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CONCLUSIONS
The doctrine of distress is established by both customary inter-
national law and by the Law of the Sea Conventions. A vessel en-
tering port due to distress, or force majeure, is subject to local
jurisdiction only if that vessel could be lawfully interfered with on
the high seas. Interference with foreign vessels on the high seas
is permitted under international law only where circumstances
indicate the vessel is a pirate, or is stateless, or is engaged in un-
authorized broadcasting or in the slave trade. An insurgent ves-
sel can only be considered a pirate under international law if its
depredations are conducted for private (non-political) ends, or
are directed against ships, persons, or property of (neutral) third
States. An effective insurgent warship is an essential part of the
political process which identifies the sovereign of its State, and
thus such a ship cannot be considered as stateless. Thus an in-
surgent warship is not subject to lawful interference on the high
seas by neutral third States absent circumstances which evidence
depredations of third State vessels.
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